Alongside the clear Syrian dimension, there is a Lebanese dimension for the battles that are ongoing in the city of Tripoli, with the aim of redrawing the flawed domestic balances.

This angle was disregarded due to the magnitude of the events in Syria, the numerous complications accompanying them and their awaited repercussions at the level of the entire region. And Lebanon is one of the arenas that will witness massive changes, whether during the revolutionary course in Syria, or following the collapse of what is left of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

The Tripoli battles, along with their unprecedented pace and violence since the beginning of the week, reveal that the internal balance of power which was strongly titling in favor of the March 8 alliance since 2008 can now be changed, or at least subjected to amendment politically and on the field. This conclusion is based on the fact that the Lebanese climate imposed by Hezbollah and its supporters via their attack on Beirut in May of that year, is linked to the regional system which is going through its last days in Damascus. Moreover, the Arab Spring will renew its Lebanese formula, in a way going more in line with the developments in the region.

This idea is based on the strategic mistake committed by Hezbollah through its blatant bias in favor of Al-Assad’s regime, thus disregarding the nature of the wide Syrian popular revolution and the impossibility of keeping the Syrians the hostages of the Baath party’s rejectionist gibberish on one hand, and the familial mafia rule on the other. And regardless of the Iranian factor which imposed the Lebanese party’s bias – as the Islamic Republic preferred to maintain the military and security power it sponsored, funded and trained as a card in the overall Iranian strategy, even if at the expense of Hezbollah’s credibility and relations with its pluralistic sectarian and political surrounding – this mistake gave an opportunity to many forces to besiege and isolate Hezbollah within its limited group, and undermine the extensions it established and in which it invested outside its direct environment. Among these extensions are the armed groups supporting it in Tripoli. The latter attempts to feature the exposure of the party’s rhetoric in order to lead it back to its narrow denominational and sectarian components and eliminate the aura of the resistance which confronted Israel, after it deemed it easy to waste its moral and symbolic capital in the narrow alleyways of Lebanese sectarian politics, and lead it – whether willingly or unwillingly – within an alliance of minorities.

In reality, the March 8 alliance also misread the transformations within the Sunni sect, from the retreat of political Harirism, the stripping of its slogans of any practical content, the absence of any vision or charisma in the ranks of its leaders among numerous other shortcomings, and the escalation of deprivation and marginalization within the Sunni villages (in a way bringing back to mind the situation in Syria). There are also the pressures practiced by the Sunni base to push toward direct action, in response to the attempts to marginalize the sect from the Lebanese political equation and are led by Michel Aoun with Hezbollah’s and Amal’s cover, under the pretext of regaining the rights of the Christians.

And following relatively minor operations, such as the clashes in Tarik al-Jdideh in Beirut, the sit-in in Sidon and the shows of power in Akkar, the time seemed right to expand the scope of the clashes and address a message to whom it may concern, saying that the situation is about to witness drastic change. All of this happened without any consideration for the facts surrounding the identity of the side which provoked the infighting in Tripoli.

At this point, there is no room for any serious talk about the role of the Lebanese state and its institutions in containing the armed actions, at a time when the conflict is revolving around the future of this state and these institutions. On the other hand, it would be hard for the supporters of the Syrian regime to reconsider their positions, as they have decided to drown with it.

Nonetheless, this in no way means that a bright future awaits the Lebanese at the corner.